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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) became the smallest World Trade
Organization (WTO) member state to win a case against the United States, one
of the WTO's largest and most powerful members.' In United States -
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, the dispute settlement system's appellate body found that U.S. law
restricting internet gambling violated U.S. obligations committed to under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),2 which the country signed
in 1994. After years of working its way through the WTO dispute settlement
system's lengthy appeals process, the case has made Antigua a big winner, and
has placed the United States in a tough position.'
As a result of the United States dragging its feet in complying with the
ruling of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), Antigua came forward with a
new and unusual "cross-sector" proposal: On June 22,2007, Antigua requested
authorization to infringe on U.S. intellectual property rights through
suspension of its obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).4 An arbitrator eventually granted this
authorization up to the amount of $21 million annually,5 though it remains
unclear if the remedy is satisfactory. Thus, while the United States appears to
be resisting any attempt by the WTO or other members to induce its
compliance, Antigua has raised the stakes, and the United States is now trying
to buy its way out of its commitments.'
' Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, 7 373, 374, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). Bradley S.
Klapper, US. May Be Target in Gambling Dispute, WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, at D7.
2 Appellate Body Report, Measures Affecting Gambling and Betting Services, 373(c)(ii),
WT/DS285/AB/R.
' General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 11B, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, art. XXI, 1(a), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
4 Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United States-Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/22
(June 22, 2007).
' Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, 3.188, 3.189, 4.7, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).
6 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Alters Services Schedule to A void Ruling on Gambling, Refuses
Antigua Compensation, INT'LTRADE DAILY, May 7,2007, at D8 (noting that although a member
that modifies its commitments must make "compensatory adjustment," U.S. officials said there
was very little chance of offering compensation because "no WTO member either bargained for
or reasonably could have expected [a U.S.] commitment on gambling"). See also Daniel Pruzin,
[Vol. 37:151
MOVING ALL-IN WITH THE WTO
Part II and Ill of this Note examine the WTO's dispute settlement system
and presents a background of this case. Part IV discusses retaliation within the
WTO framework and the use of cross-sector retaliation as proposed by
Antigua, and analyzes its likely effect based on other similar, although rare,
requests.7 This Note argues that the suspension of TRIPS obligations may be
the best option available to Antigua because other more traditional
countermeasures will have no effect on the United States. Part V of this Note
analyzes the withdrawal of concessions that the United States opted for instead
of complying with the ruling and the effects any action taken in this case will
have on the efficacy of the WTO dispute mechanisms. The recent adverse
ruling against the United States presents a difficult test for the young WTO.
Thus, this Note argues that in order to solidify its future status as a relevant
factor in international trade, the WTO must stand up to the United States and
deliver a fair and effective remedy, as well as stand beside Antigua in the
attempt to avoid a U.S. withdrawal from its obligations.
II. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
When the WTO was formed, the dispute settlement system received
particular praise as the "crown jewel[ ]" of the organization,' and this
expectation is now being tested. According to the WTO's first Director
General, the dispute settlement system is "in many ways the central pillar of
the multilateral trading system.... [I]t is also an important guarantee of fair
trade for less powerful countries."9 The United States was one of the driving
US. Holds First Round of Talks with Nations Requesting Compensation for Gambling Ban,
INT'L TRADE DAILY, July 17, 2007, at D4 (noting that the United States held "talks with
countries seeking compensation for the U.S. decision to alter its [WTO] services schedule in
order to maintain a ban on cross-border Internet gambling").
' See Recourse to Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU by Brazil,
United States--Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/26 (Oct. 7, 2005) (seeking
authorization to suspend TRIPS and GATS obligations in response to subsidies to goods
producers); Recourse by Ecuador to Article 22.2 of DSU, European Communities-Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/52 (Nov. 9, 1999) (seeking
authorization to suspend TRIPS and GATS obligations in response to tariff preferences on
goods).
8 Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 130, 131 (2003).
9 Henrik Horn et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased? 1 (Ctr. for
Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 2340, 1999), available at http://www.iimahd.er
net.in/-partha/MavroidisCEPR2340.pdf(quoting Renato Ruggiero, Former Dir.-Gen., WTO,
Address to the Korean Business Association, The Future Path of the Multilateral Trading System
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forces in the establishment of the dispute settlement system,' recognizing that
"an effective dispute settlement system advantages the United States not only
through the ability to secure the benefits negotiated under the agreements, but
also by encouraging the rule of law among nations."" The then-United States
Trade Representative stated that "it is in the U.S. interest to have a [strong]
WTO... because the United States has the most open economy in the world
and will benefit the most from seeing free trade rules strictly enforced."' 2
When a country wins a case, the preferred result is for the losing country
to adjust its trade practices to comply with its commitments.' 3 This enables the
aggrieved country's industries to continue operation. But "the WTO dispute
settlement system cannot order a country to change its laws."' 4 While full
compliance is the ideal outcome, the best outcome that is realistic is for the
countries to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement. If these negotiations fail,
the winning country is authorized to impose countermeasures, which are
otherwise illegal trade sanctions that seek to punish the violating country and
attempt to induce compliance. 5
The WTO agreements are enforced through a dispute settlement system, the
rules and procedures of which are set out in Annex 2 of the WTO agreement,
known as the DSU.' 6 When a country wins a dispute and is authorized to
suspend concessions to another WTO member, "the general principle is that
(Apr. 17, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/sprre/seoule.htm).
'0 See SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH STRATEGY REGARDING WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANELS AND THE APPELLATE BODY 2, Dec. 30, 2002, available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/ReporttoCongress.pdf (discussing the United States' particular interest
in "an effective process to enforce U.S. rights under multilateral trade agreements").
Id.
12 David S. Cloud, Critics Fear GATT May Declare Open Season on U.S. Laws, 52 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 2005, 2005-10 (July 23, 1994), available at http://library.cqpress.com.proxy-r
emote.galib.uga.edu:2048/cqweekly/WR1 03405095.
"3 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, arts. 22.1, 22.2, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU] (covering compensation and the suspension of concessions following a
recommendation or ruling).
'" Daniel B. Pickard & Tina Potuto Kimble, Can U.S. Safeguard Actions Survive WTO
Review?: Section 201 Investigations in International Trade Law, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 43,49 (2007).
" See DSU art. 22.2 (explaining circumstances under which "any party having invoked the
dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the
application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations").
16 Id. art. 1.1.
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the complaining party [will] first seek to" retaliate within the same sector as
that in which the violation occurred. 7 If this is not "practicable or effective,"
the complaining party can seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in
other sectors under the same agreement. 8 If that also is not practicable or
effective, it may retaliate by suspending "concessions or other obligations
under another covered agreement."' 9
I. BACKGROUND: ANTIGUA WINS THE CASE
A. History of the Dispute
In 1999, the tiny island nation of Antigua and Barbuda hosted over one
hundred internet gambling companies, which made up around ten percent of
the island's gross domestic product and employed roughly 3,000 people.2" In
the last few years, the Antiguan online gambling industry has been reduced by
about eighty-five percent.2' The country has blamed the United States for
becoming increasingly aggressive in blocking these operations.22
The WTO dispute began after an American citizen, Jay Cohen, was arrested
and imprisoned for taking bets through his internet gambling site, World
Sports Exchange Ltd., that he and some friends ran out of Antigua.23 Cohen
was charged and convicted in U.S. federal court of taking bets transmitted over
wire in violation of a 1961 U.S. law commonly known as the Wire Wager
17 Id. art. 22.3(a).
18 Id. art. 22.3(b).
19 Id. art. 22.3(c).
20 See First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 7, WT/DS285 (Oct. 8, 2003),
available at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/business_politics/pdf/Antigua_firstsubmission_e
xecutivesummary.pdf. For a thorough summary of Antigua's gambling industry, including
information about its WTO case and relevant U.S. legislation, see Antigua Online Gaming
Association, http://www.aoga.ag/index.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
2' Burke Hansen, Antigua Calls for Pirates to Return to Caribbean, REGISTER,
May 23, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/23/antiguawtousgambling/.
22 See, e.g., First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda, Measures Affecting Gambling and
Betting Services, 37, WT/DS285 (claiming that U.S. restrictions violate its GATS obligations).
23 Paul Blustein, AgainstA l1 Odds: Antigua Besting US. in Internet Gambling Case at WTO,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at D1.
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Act.24 While he was in prison, Cohen learned that the United States was
vulnerable to a trade complaint, and he urged Antigua to bring the case.2"
B. Antigua's Claim and the United States' Defense
In 2003, Antigua requested a WTO panel, claiming that U.S. law illegally
restricted the offshore supply of gambling and betting services in violation of
its commitments under the GATS. 26 The basic argument was that if the United
States allowed any internet gambling at all, then its WTO commitments
required that it not impose any barriers to foreign companies seeking access to
its market.27 While U.S. federal law contains no explicit prohibition of internet
gambling, it has several laws that aim to restrict its operation.28 In addition to
four state laws, Antigua's claimed several U.S. laws were illegal under the
GATS, 29 including the Wire Act,3" the Travel Act,3' and the Illegal Gambling
24 David B. McGinty, The Near-Regulation of Online Sports Wagering by United States v.
Cohen, 7 GAMING L. REv. 205, 207 (2003) (citing United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 70-71
(2d Cir. 2001)). See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000) ("Whoever being engaged in the business of
betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets
or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication
which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.").
25 See Blustein, supra note 23 (stating that Cohen "alerted the Antiguans," who eventually
filed a complaint when the "gambling industry... agreed to foot the bill").
26 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/2 (June 13, 2003).
27 See id. (contending that the United States' "total prohibition of gambling and betting
services offered from outside of the United States appears to conflict with the United States'
obligations under GATS" and pointing out that "[U.S.] authorities allow numerous operators of
United States origin to offer all types of gambling and betting services [within U.S. borders]");
see also Henry Lanman, Rolling the Dice: The United States'Big Legal Gamble with Internet
Gaming, SLATE, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2153352/ (noting that the Wire Act
does not prohibit bets taken within a single state or "interstate [bets made] on horse racing").
2 McGinty, supra note 24, at 206.
29 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, 7.2(b), WT/D238/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
0 The Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
3' The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(aHb) (2000) (carrying fines and maximum
imprisonment for "[w]hoever travels in interstate commerce or foreign commerce or uses the
mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to ... promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of
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Business Act.32 The Panel found that all of these laws violated the United
States' obligations under the GATS.33
The United States did not sit by idly, and it asserted several defenses. One
was a "public morals" defense based on GATS section XIV, claiming that the
legislation was necessary to promote public morals and the public order by
preventing minors from gambling and by preventing the laundering of
organized crime proceeds through internet gambling sites. 34 The defense failed
because the United States could not show that it completely prohibited all
forms of internet gambling, due to the existence of several online gambling
operations, such as Xpressbet.com, which allow internet wagering on horse
racing. 35 The United States appealed the ruling, and the case was ultimately
decided by the appellate body, which found that U.S. gambling laws were
unlawful violations of its GATS obligations.36 To determine the amount of
time the United Stats had to comply with the decision, a WTO DSB arbitrator
gave the United States a " 'reasonable period of time' " to comply with its
ruling,37 presumably by either changing its domestic laws or by opening access
to the online-gambling market. This time period expired on April 3, 2006, and
one week later, the United States submitted a report to the DSB stating that the
"'Department of Justice views the existing criminal statutes as prohibiting the
interstate transmission of bets or wagers, including wagers on horse races'....
In view of these circumstances, the United States is in compliance with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. 38
any unlawful activity..." and defining "unlawful activity" as "any business enterprise involving
gambling...").
32 The Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000).
3 Panel Report, Measures Affecting Gambling andBetting Services, 7.2(b), WT/DS285/R
(discussing the violation of the United States GATS schedule, section 10-D).
4 Id. 6.444. See GATs, supra note 3, art. XIV (allowing an exception for adoption of
measures necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order).
3" Panel Report, Measures Affecting Gambling andBetting Services, M 6.588, 6.589, 6.607,
WT/DS285/R.
36 Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, 373, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
37 Arbitration Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, 68, WT/DS285/13 (Aug. 19, 2005) (determining that the
reasonable period of time was "[eleven] months and [two] weeks from April 20, 2005, which
was the date the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body Reports").
38 Status Report by the United States, Addendum, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/15/add. 1 (Apr. 11, 2006).
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On June 8, 2006, Antigua requested consultations under Article 21.5 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU), in which the parties unsuccessfully attempted to reach a settlement of
the dispute.39 The March 2007 report of the Article 21.5 Panel concluded that
the United States had still not complied with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB.4"
C. Withdrawal of Commitments and Retaliation
In May 2007, the United States announced that it was proposing to modify
its GATS schedule-which it claims included a drafting oversight-to enable
it to legally restrict offshore online gambling operations.4 Under GATS, a
country can modify or withdraw from any commitment in its schedule after
three years have elapsed from when the commitment took force.4 2 Any
member withdrawing commitments must pay appropriate compensation to any
affected member in order "to maintain a general level of mutually
advantageous commitments no[ ] less favourable than" those which existed
prior to the negotiations.43 According to the Deputy United States Trade
Representative John K. Veroneau, when the United States drafted its
international commitments to open its market to recreation services in the
early 1990s, it failed to make clear that these commitments" 'did not extend
to gambling' "even though that was its intent." The United States made the
unprecedented offer to modify its GATS schedule "in order to bring the United
States into compliance and to resolve the dispute permanently." '45 The United
19 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, Request for Consultations,
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/17 (June 12, 2006) (outlining Antigua's request for consultations and the insistence
of United States' Department of Justice that the United States is in compliance with the DSB
rulings). See DSU, art. 21.5 (detailing appropriate procedures when disagreement arises over
compliance with rulings).
40 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, 7.1, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007).
" See Doug Palmer, U.S. to Keep Internet Gambling Ban, REUTERS, May 4, 2007, http://
www.reuters.com/article/politicsnews/idUSWAT00742720070504 (stating that "the United
States will.. . modify its... services commitments [under the WTO] and explicitly exclude
gambling").
42 GATS, supra note 3, art. XXI, l(a).
41 Id. 2(a).
' Palmer, supra note 41.
45 Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, U.S. WEB BET BANTARGETED IN WTO Surr, http://www.ma
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States claimed, "This modification will ensure... the original U.S. intent of
excluding gambling from the scope of U.S. commitments."46 Antigua
expressed shock that the United States would drag this case on for so long,
only to withdraw at the last minute.47 It also dismissed U.S. claims of a
drafting oversight.48 Soon afterwards, Antigua responded formally.
On June 21,2007, Antigua requested authorization from the DSB, pursuant
to Article 22.2 of the DSU, "to suspend the application to the United States of
concessions and related obligations under the [GATS and the TRIPS]."49
Specifically, Antigua intended to suspend its obligations under Sections I, H,
IV, V, and VII, of the TRIPS agreements, covering copyrights, trademarks,
industrial designs, patents, and protection of undisclosed information.5" In
total, Antigua requested suspensions worth over $3.4 billion.5 The small
nation stated that this large amount matched the impairment or nullification of
benefits it would have accrued since the end of the compliance period on
April 3, 2006, when the United failed to comply with the rulings of the DSB.52
The United States responded that Antigua should only receive $500,000 in
compensation, and certainly no more than $3 million.53 The United States
argued that the "figure should be based only on the potential market in the
United States for online horserace betting."54 The United States insisted the
lower figure was an appropriate amount of compensation because the WTO
panel based its holding on the fact that U.S. law allows remote gambling
domestically, thus discriminating against foreign companies in this narrow
category." The United States and Antigua engaged in negotiations, which
natt.com/news.aspx?id=4675 (June 6, 2007).
46 Id.
41 U.S. Alters Services Schedule, supra note 6.
48 Id. Antigua's attorney, Mark Mendel, stated that" '[o]ver 100 countries were able to
exclude gambling from their commitments, a number ofthem- including the [European Union]
- by expressly excluding gambling from their schedules... It cannot be possible that it was
overlooked by the United States.'" Id.
49 Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
5' Daniel Pruzin, Services: US. Says Antigua Entitled to $500,000 Compensation in WTO
Gambling Dispute, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 27, 2007, at D12.
54 Id.
51 Id. Since at the peak of Antigua's gambling industry, its total services exports totaled $47
million, and horse racing accounts for seven percent of total domestic gambling, "the 'highest
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were extended past the original deadline and failed to result in an agreeable
solution.56 On December 21, 2007, the arbitrator announced its decision that
Antigua may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement at a level not exceeding $21 million annually.5"
Thus, such differing views on the appropriate outcome of this case, as well as
the imbalance in power of the parties, have made this situation difficult for the
WTO system to resolve.
IV. U.S. COMPLIANCE AND CROSS-SECTOR RETALIATION
When the United States joined the WTO, there was much debate about
whether it was giving up too much sovereignty in return for an enforced rule
of law in international trade.5" The United States had "given up its ability to
enact legislation inconsistent with the WTO rules without violating its
international obligations [, and] the United States is also subject to WTO
dispute settlement complaints by other members."59 Recognizing that any
treaty necessarily requires giving up some degree of national sovereignty,6 ° the
United States accepted the possibility that another member might successfully
challenge a U.S. law, and it would be compelled to comply with such an
adverse ruling. This case has turned that possibility into a reality, as the
United States is being held to strict enforcement of the rules. However, instead
possible' level of gambling services that would be affected by U.S. compliance is $3.3. million
per year." Furthermore, since the $47 million figure represents Antigua's total worldwide
services exports, and not just those to the U.S., actual losses are probably around $500,000 per
year.
56 Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Forwards Offers for Compensation in Gambling Dispute, Sets New
Talks Deadline, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 25, 2007, at Dl (reporting that deadline has been
extended to Oct. 22, 2007); Daniel Pruzin, US. Extends WTO Talks on Compensating EU, Other
for Internet Gambling Exclusion, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 23, 2007, at D3 (reporting that
deadline has been extended to December 14, 2007).
" Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, 3.188, 3.189, WT/DS258/ARB (Dec. 31, 2007).
" See Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the
Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 307, 329 (1996) (referring to the debate over U.S. sovereignty and the WTO). See
generally Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. INT'L L.
& PRAc. 3 (1995) (providing a detailed history of the creation of the WTO and including a
discussion of the debate concerning U.S. sovereignty).
" Schaefer, supra note 58, at 330.
60 Id.
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of honoring its previous call for strict enforcement, the United States is trying
to evade it.
In cases such as this, where a small and weak member is faced with
noncompliance by a disproportionately stronger member, one-sided
negotiations may "make compliance very hard to achieve."' This difficulty
highlights the inequality between members inherent in the WTO dispute
settlement system.62 If no settlement is reached, the winning member can
request arbitration, although arbitration had never been requested because of
unsuccessful compensation negotiations.63 In this event, the winning member
requests compensation, which in some cases may come in the form of cross-
sector retaliation.
"Compensation" in the context of the WTO has a very different meaning
than its ordinary use in international law.' Normally, compensation is a
retrospective remedy designed to compel damages from a person who has
caused injury to the injured person in order to make the injured person whole.65
In the WTO, this remedy does not compensate for past harm, but rather grants
a forward-looking trade benefit to the "prevailing party in order to
prospectively compensate for the nullification or impairment" caused by the
violation.66 Compensation is only a temporary measure, available in case the
"recommendations and rulings are not implemented in a reasonable period of
time."67 Moreover, compensation must be agreed to by both parties, and the
party collecting compensation must secure the cooperation of the violating
party.68
61 Joost Pauwelyn, Note and Comment, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:
Rules are Rules - Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335,338 (2000).
62 Id.
63 The only time in WTO history where modification of schedules has been dealt with was
when the EU modified its schedule to account for its enlargement in 1995 and 2004, and "[t]hose
negotiations ended successfully with compensation agreements between the EU and affected
WTO members." US. Alters Services Schedule, supra note 6.
4 Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO's "Toughest" Case: An Examination ofthe Effectiveness
of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure in the Airbus-Boeing Dispute Over Aircraft
Subsidies, 71 J. AIR L. & CoM. 191, 232 (2006). Carlos M. Vlzquez & John H. Jackson, Some
Reflections on Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 555, 560 (2002).
65 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (8th ed. 2004).
' VAzquez & Jackson, supra note 64, at 530; Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 64, at 232.
67 DSU art. 22.1.
61 Id. art. 22.2; see also Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 64, at 232-34, 243-47 (noting the
limits of the WTO system in the area of compensation and calling for a rule change, but pointing
out that most members would prefer to maintain flexibility in deciding whether to offer
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This idea of compensation reveals a severe shortcoming of the current
dispute settlement system in cases where a large and a small country are
negotiating. A member such as the United States, which holds considerable
bargaining power in compensation negotiations, will seek to extend the
"reasonable period of time" as long as it can.69 The prospective nature of the
remedy gives an advantage to violating countries that drag their feet in
implementing a ruling, and adequate compensation for Antigua during this
time will be reduced as time passes, until the ruling is implemented.70 If no
agreement is reached, then suspensions of trade concessions may be granted,
but unlike traditional compensation, this remedy does not compensate for past
losses; it only "rebalances the playing field" for the future trading
relationship.71
Prospective application, of course, introduces a situation wherein a violator
may be "better off having broken the rules than complying with them" because
it is not liable for past damages.72 The United States could violate its
agreements on gambling for years, work though the WTO appeals system for
several more years, and then agree to comply with the ruling, and owe nothing.
This is essentially what the United States has done, but instead of complying,
it is attempting to withdraw its obligations and give forward-looking
compensation to Antigua in another area of trade. It began negotiations over
compensation terms with Antigua and other members who joined the dispute.
The only advantage Antigua has is the ability to withhold its agreement to the
compensation offer and to go back to the DSB to request authorization for
suspension of concessions.
As noted above, under general international law, a state in breach of an
obligation is required to cease the violation and to restore the situation that
previously existed, compensating the injured party for its loss.73 In keeping
with this principle, the DSB should make every effort to get the United States
compensation).
69 See Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 64, at 225-27 (discussing the "reasonable period of
time" provision and how nations such as the United States may ignore rulings).
70 Id. at 233 (describing the rules that create "a premium to noncomplying countries that drag
their feet").
7" Vdzquez & Jackson, supra note 64, at 650.
72 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 64, at 233.
7 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text; see also Vdzquez & Jackson, supra
note 64, at 560 (stating that a "member's responsibility for breaching an obligation under the
WTO agreements appears to be more limited than a state's responsibility under general
international law for a breach of an obligation under international law").
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to fully comply with its obligations. The DSB should make withdrawal of
concessions prohibitively expensive so that it will no longer be the best course
of action for the United States.
For any retaliatory measure to be effective, it must do two things: inflict
loss on the targeted party and benefit the country using the measure. 4
However, same-sector retaliation in this case will have the exact opposite
effect. Since the TRIPS commitments undertaken by developing countries are
designed to benefit producers in developed countries, as most developing
countries do not have significant intellectual property rights, it can be a useful
tool for developing countries to use against developed countries." Antigua's
retaliation against U.S. intellectual property rights will likely hurt the United
States more than same-sector retaliation would, but at an amount of $21
million, it is unlikely to be very effective against the large American economy
as a whole. Additionally, while it will make Antigua better off than it would
be without the authorization, it does not make the country better off than it
would have been if the United States had agreed to comply with the decision.
Thus, the effectiveness of Antigua's award will likely depend on the degree to
which American intellectual property holders will put pressure on the
administration and Congress to avoid retaliation by complying with the DSB's
decision.
In this case, cross-sector retaliation using intellectual property rights under
TRIPS seems to be the only available remedy that will level the playing field.
The preferred option of same-sector retaliation is clearly not an option for
Antigua. It cannot seriously be argued that a country of Antigua's size could
impose normal trade sanctions on an economy as large as the United States.76
The damage felt by the United States could be little more than a " 'pin
prick.' ," Furthermore, action against the United States could quite possibly
hurt Antigua more than it would help.78
"' See Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS ServeAsAn EnforcemeniDevice
for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 403 (2000) (proposing that
developing countries use TRIPS obligations as a retaliatory weapon against developed countries
where more traditional counter measures are ineffective).
" See id. at 404 (describing the dynamic between developing and developed countries in
terms of TRIPS commitments).
76 Gary Rivlin, Place Your Bet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at C1.
7" Id.
7' Retaliation is even more counterproductive for developing countries, as they may "cut
themselves off from access to foreign goods or make those goods more expensive for their
domestic customers." Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in
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The United States had reason to worry, however, because the right to
infringe on intellectual property rights, which Antigua asked the DSB to
authorize, had been granted before.79 In the landmark case of European
Communities -Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas
(Bananas), between the European Union and Ecuador, the WTO authorized
retaliatory measures by a developing country on another member, cross-sector
retaliation, and trade retaliation that threatened intellectual property rights
under the TRIPS agreement.80 All three authorizations were firsts for the
DSB.s1
When Ecuador sought this remedy in its case against the European
Community (EC), it exhibited many of the same characteristics as Antigua: It
was a disproportionately small developing country challenging one of the
world's largest trading entities. Ecuador withstood pressure from the United
States at that time, which was also involved in the case, to join them in
settlement talks.82 Instead, Ecuador allowed time for negotiations with the EC,
stood tough, and made its cross-sector retaliation requests.8 3 It was an
important step for developing countries around the world, and it may have
inspired Antigua's course of action in this case. Like Ecuador, Antigua must
stand strong, as it has thus far, and seek continued support from the world trade
community to ensure that its rights are protected.
Given the David-and-Goliath nature of this case, a nontraditional
countermeasure appears to be the only weapon that could be effective against
a country like the United States. 4 In fact, based on the economic disparity
the WTO: Improving the Remedies of PTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 101, 104
(2005) (noting that many developing countries have markets that are "too small to exercise
retaliatory pressure on non-complying WTO Members"). These countries retaliate "at the peril
of their own development and position in world markets." Id
" See Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, 171, 173(d), WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000)
(allowing Ecuador to suspend obligations under TRIPS).
'0 Id. 176-177.
8l Daniel Pruzin, PTO: Hailing Final P/TO Decision in Banana Case Ecuador Sees
Landmark For Poor Countries, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 28, 2000, at D5.
82 See James McCall Smith, Compliance Bargaining in the P/TO: Ecuador andthe Bananas
Dispute, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 257, 268
(John S. Odell ed., 2006) (describing how, in response to the United States' quick move to
impose sanctions, "Ecuador opted to allow time for negotiations with the EU... in hopes of
reaching a settlement").
83 Id. at 268-69 (explaining Ecuador's request to "suspend the application of intellectual
property rights under ... TRIPS").
" See Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United
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between the two countries, traditional countermeasures are likely to hurt
Antigua rather than help.85 DSU Article 22.3 recognizes this reality, and it
authorizes cross-sector retaliation where it is not "practicable or effective" to
impose sanctions in the same sector where the violation has occurred.86
Because of the negligible effect that traditional countermeasures are likely to
have, it is reasonable that cross-sector retaliation was authorized. Despite the
relatively small amount of the arbitrator's award, the United States still
expressed concern regarding the nature of the award. United States Trade
Representative Spokesman Sean Spicer, in a statement following the award
announcement, stated that authorization to suspend intellectual property
obligations
would establish a harmful precedent for a WTO Member to
affirmatively authorize what would otherwise be considered acts
of piracy, counterfeiting, or other forms of [intellectual property
right] infringement. Furthermore, to do so would undermine
Antigua's claimed intentions of becoming a leader in legitimate
electronic commerce, and would severely discourage foreign
investment in the Antiguan economy.87
Despite this criticism, the arbitrator seemed to recognize the necessity for
cross-sector retaliation in order to ensure fairness of awards, but at the same
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007) ("[C]easing all trade whatsoever with the United States
(approximately US$180 million annually, or less than [two] per cent of all exports from the
United States) would have virtually no impact on the economy of the United States, which could
easily shift such a relatively small volume of trade elsewhere."). Cf Pruzin, supra note 53
(describing "the vast differences between the economies of the United States and Antigua and
Barbuda").
8 See Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007) ("Given the vast difference between the economies of the United
States and Antigua and Barbuda, additional duties or restrictions on imports of goods and
services from the United States would have a much greater negative impact on Antigua and
Barbuda than it would on the United States.").
86 DSU art. 22.3.
87 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on Internet Gambling,
Dec. 21,2007, http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2007/December/Statem
entonInternetGambling.html.
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time, the $21 million authorized is not high enough to prevent large and
wealthy countries from buying the right to violate their WTO obligations.
While the amount may be inadequate to deter the United States, Antigua
can still use the concessions as leverage against the United States. It is
important to note that while Ecuador never actually suspended any concessions
in the intellectual property rights sectors, it wielded the authorization to use
cross-sector retaliation to achieve better results than any of the complainants
in the previous Bananas disputes.88 Ecuador's powerful new rights led EC
officials to "acknowledge that it may be necessary for the EU to offer
concessions to Ecuador." 9 Ecuador and the EC eventually settled, and it
showed that the new WTO system would enable low-power states to seek
retaliation against high-power states.9 °
It is possible that even though Antigua received the authorization to
infringe on U.S.-based intellectual property, it might never actually act under
that authorization. Antigua would likely benefit more from American
corporate lobbyists who would, facing the possibility that Antigua might act,
likely pressure the U.S. government to change its domestic policy.9 Thus,
Antigua's greatest tool in this case is not its own power at all, but rather it is
the opportunity to mobilize American corporations. Even though the award
amount is low, it is doubtful that American companies would feel comfortable
with small countries like Antigua developing the means to pirate their products
with the capabilities to continue production even after the awarded value has
been reached.
Cross-sector retaliation, with respect to the TRIPS agreement, can give
developing countries what has been described as "meaningful hostages" in
their trade relations with larger and more developed WTO members.92 Many
88 Matthew S. Dunne III, Note, Redefining Power Orientation: A Reassessment ofJackson 's
Paradigm in Light of Asymmetries of Power, Negotiation, and Compliance in the GA TT/WTO
Dispute Settlement System, 34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 277, 306-10 (2002) (detailing the
results).
89 Eliza Patterson, The US-EU Agreement to Resolve the Banana Dispute, ASIL INSIGHTS,
Apr. 2001, http://www.asil.org/inish69.cfn.
9' See Dunne, supra note 88, at 289 (citing instances in which low-power states have "won
judgments against high-power states").
91 Lanman, supra note 27 (suggesting that "Antigua's frank calculation here, of course, is
that while the administration might be comfortable stiffing the Antiguan trade representative, it
would probably take notice if, say, an irate Microsoft or Disney started insisting that it get this
problem solved").
92 Id.; Wilfred J. Ethier, Intellectual Property Rights and Dispute Settlement in the World
Trade Organization, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 449, 456 (2004).
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countries have moved towards open participation in the multilateral trade
system since the late 1980s.93 However, "most of these countries . . . are
unable to exert much negotiating leverage through an ability to withdraw trade
concessions.'94 This is the problem that Ecuador faced in its dispute with the
EC, and it is very much a problem in this case for Antigua. It has been
suggested that developing countries have utilized the DSB less often than
developed countries, due to a lack of legal capacity and retaliatory power.95
On the other hand, there is evidence that developing countries have
recognized the importance of using retaliatory threats as leverage to induce
compliance and have changed the way they initiate disputes to better take
advantage of the instances in which they have this leverage.96 The WTO
rightly gave Ecuador such leverage in the Bananas case, and it must help
Antigua stand on equal ground with the United States.97 TRIPS is exactly the
kind of tool developing countries should use to best exercise their rights
whenever challenging a more powerful developed country like the United
States, and the DSB must be willing to level the playing field.
When the DSB decides to grant Antigua's request for authorization to
retaliate by suspending TRIPS rights, it should make a decision whether to
widen the authorization's geographic scope. In Bananas, the authorization
allowed Ecuadorian companies that had legally pirated foreign products to sell
only in the local Ecuadorian market.98 The arbitrators that granted the right to
violate European intellectual property rights recognized because Ecuador was
a small developing nation, it was very possible that it would not be able to
implement the full amount authorized.99 Whereas Ecuador's population at the
" Ethier, supra note 92, at 456.
94 Id.
9' See Horn, supra note 9, at 13 (noting a "pattern whereby larger and richer countries tend
to bring more complaints, and smaller and poorer countries less complaints, than expected" and
proposing that "[o]ne reason could be that developing countries... lack legal resources to bring
complaints to the WTO"). But see Chad P. Bown, Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and
Defendants in GA T/WTO Trade Disputes, 27 THE WORLD ECONOMY 59,67-68 (documenting
evidence that the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty
determinations by GATTI/WTO panels have led to more success for developing countries under
the WTO than under GATT).
96 Bown, supra note 95, at 78.
9' See discussion supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
98 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale,
and Distribution of Bananas, 154-155, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
9 Id. 177.
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time of the decision was approximately 13 million 00 and therefore was
probably unable to consume and produce all of the products it was able to
produce as a result of the authorization, Antigua has an even better argument:
its population is less than one-hundred thousand and likely has similar
production and consumption concerns.'0 Therefore, concerns about the
ineffectiveness of suspending TRIPS obligations for the Ecuadorian domestic
market are even stronger here. In order to put actual pressure on the United
States to comply with the WTO rulings, the authorizations should allow
Antiguan companies to produce and sell products outside their own domestic
market, up to the specified dollar amount that is determined to be sufficient.
This broader authorization would give Antigua the appropriate leverage to
pressure the United States into complying.
The United States, of course, sees this differently and views such retaliation
as a dangerous precedent. Furthermore, the United States expected that the
award would be limited to Antigua and that no other member would benefit
from the authorization.0 2  The Office of the United States Trade
Representative has stated that "[a]ny authorization pursuant to the award
would be strictly limited to Antigua; every other WTO Member remains
obliged to protect U.S. [intellectual property rights] under WTO rules,
including enforcement against any goods [that infringe upon intellectual
property rights]." '' 3 If this is indeed the case, the limited Antiguan economy
may reduce the impact it might have and make this a hard award to pay off.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE
An important aspect of the dispute between Ecuador and the EC was that
throughout the dispute and negotiations the parties appeared to be willing to
compromise.'" "The [European Community] made an effort to maintain an
appearance of compliance with its WTO obligations and of a willingness to
comply with adverse judgments, all of which demonstrate that the WTO
affects the behavior and perceptions of states."'0 5  The EC showed a
"0 The World Factbook 2000- Ecuador, http://www.exportinfo.org/worldfactbook/ecuador
WFB.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
01 The World Factbook 2000 - Antigua and Barbuda, http://www.exportinfo.org/worldfact
book/antiguaWFB.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
102 Statement of Internet Gambling, supra note 87.
103 Id.
104 Dunne, supra note 88, at 314.
105 Id.
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willingness to cooperate with the system, even when it was working against
them. Even if the EC was threatening Ecuador behind the closed doors of the
negotiation room, it at least lent a cooperative appearance to boost the
reputation and the progress of the dispute settlement system. The United
States, on the other hand, has repeatedly and uncharacteristically appeared
resistant to the ruling against it and threatens to undermine the efficacy of the
dispute settlement system.
Indeed, the power of a state should not be measured in a vacuum, and any
appraisal of power must take into account behavior, values, attitudes,
objectives, and expectations.'16 The United States might be viewed as less
likely to make the effort to appear cooperative because it may feel no real need
to cooperate. Even though it can be important even for powerful states to act
in legitimate ways, some have noted the tendency of the United States to
ignore international law whenever it wishes.1"7 While it is both expected and
appropriate for the United States to oppose an adverse ruling and the
extraordinarily high damages that Antigua has asked for, the DSB should
ensure that the United States does not flout the system by withdrawing its
commitments without affording a proper remedy to the injured parties. This
is very important in order for the WTO to maintain its purpose as a system that
establishes a "level playing field" for every member, regardless of size and
power. With the growing amount of compensation that will be required with
the requests of the additional members that have joined the dispute, the
likelihood of a settlement may decrease, and it will be even more important for
the WTO to arrive at an appropriate decision that will be enforceable.
The U.S. response throughout this case has, not surprisingly, angered some
WTO members. The original denial of any violation revealed hypocrisy in
light of the United States' recent demands for other states to comply with their
own obligations. As one international lawyer tracking the case has stated,
" 'One day they're out there saying how scandalous it is that China doesn't
respect W.T.O. decisions, [b]ut then the next day there's a dispute that doesn't
go their way and their attitude is: The decision is completely wrong ... [;] why
'0" WLLAM MARK HABEEB, POWER AND TAcTICs IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: How
WEAK NATIONS BARGAIN WITH STRONG NATIONS 14 (1988).
107 See John B. Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, The United States and
International Law (June 6,2007), http://www.state.gov/s/I/rls/86123.htm ("Our critics sometimes
paint the United States as a country willing to duck or shrug off international obligations when
they prove constraining or inconvenient.").
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should we comply?"' 8  The WTO and each of its members have an
overwhelming interest in making sure that the United States complies so that
the WTO may maintain its legitimacy by securing international cooperation.
Even some U.S. politicians recognize the danger of withdrawal. At a
meeting with Antigua's Prime Minister, New York Representative Charles
Rangel told reporters that he thinks his "country is wrong in trying to change
the rules of the WTO."'10 9
Furthermore, the announcement that the United States will maintain its ban
on internet gambling services was unexpected and deeply disappointing to
Antigua, as Antigua's Finance and Economy Minister called the decision
"almost incomprehensible."" 0 Mark Mendel, lead counsel for Antigua, noted
that "in the 25-plus cases it had expressly lost, it never once had refused to
comply, much less try to withdraw its treaty obligations in the affected
sector."''l  Under GATS, a country can modify or withdraw from any
commitment in its schedule after three years have elapsed from when the
commitment took force." 12 Therefore, if the United States wishes to rescind its
commitment to allow internet gambling, it can-but at a significant cost,
because appropriate compensation must accompany any withdrawal." 3
The island nation of roughly 70,000 garnered the support of the European
Union, Japan, India, Canada, Australia, Costa Rica, and Macao, who all joined
Antigua in requesting compensation from the United States for the change in
its service schedule.' Australia has since dropped its claims, and Japan has
settled."'5 The remaining countries, led by the European Union which includes
the United Kingdom's multi-billion dollar online gambling industry, however,
could subject the United States to tens of billions of dollars more in
's Rivlin, supra note 76, at C1 (quoting Lode Van Den Hende, an international trade lawyer
with the firm Herbert Smith in Brussels).
09 Associated Press, Antigua Prime Minister Hopes Talks with U.S. Lawmakers Will Ease
Internet Gambling Dispute, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 11, 2007.
"0 Palmer, supra note 41.
. Burke Hansen, Antigua Attorney Speaks Out on Landmark WTO Case, REGISTER,
July 16, 2007, http://www.theregister.com/2007/07/16/antiguaywtomendel/.
..2 GATS, supra note 3, art. XXI, 1(a).
113 See id. 2(a) (stating that "the modifying Member shall enter into negotiations with a view
to reaching agreement on any necessary compensatory adjustment").
"' Gary G. Yerkey, Compensation Talks in WTO Gambling Case Could Extend Beyond
Sept. 22, US. Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 6, 2007, at D11.
"5 Daniel Pruzin, U.S., Japan Reach WTO Settlement on Internet Gambling Compensation
Claim, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 28, 2007, at Dl 8.
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compensation." 6 Thus, the United States' decision to change the schedule
opened the door to significantly more damages and new criticism." 7
In addition to these economic concerns, the United States should be careful
that it does not severely damage its credibility. Being pegged as a rule violator
has consequences for the United States, even without the pressure of retaliation
by the other party." 8 If the United States shirks its obligations and fails to lead
by example in complying with WTO rulings, other members will similarly
show a lack of respect for the rules of the dispute settlement system." 9 Other
countries watch how the United States acts in implementing the rules of its
trade agreements and they often follow its example. 2 '
Rather than make such a drastic and expensive modification, the United
States could simply change its laws and allow online gambling. In fact, U.S.
Representative Barney Frank has introduced legislation that would lift the
gambling ban. 2 There are several compelling reasons for the United States
to do so. The moral arguments put forth for the ban are inconsistent with the
actual state of U.S. gambling: In almost every state in the country, it is lawful
to gamble on either horse racing, dog racing, or state lotteries or in brick and
mortar casinos. 22 A commonly cited justification for the ban is the prevention
of money laundering.'23 But other forms of payment, such as "e-wallets,' 24
Telebuy,125 and the prospect of online gamblers setting up offshore bank
accounts, may make money laundering easier than with the regular use of
.16 Press Release, Safe and Secure Internet Gambling Initiative, U.S. Defiance of WTO
Internet Gambling Rulings Could Result in Domestic and International Repurcussions
(July 30, 2007), http://www.safeandsecureig.org/media/wtorelease.pdf.
117 See Palmer, supra note 41 (quoting an Antiguan official as describing the United States'
decision as "almost incomprehensible").
118 Schaefer, supra note 58, at 326.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2046, 110th Cong.
(2007).
122 Caroline Bissett, CommentAllBets are Off(Line): Antigua's Trouble in Virtual Paradise, 35
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 367,369 (2004). See also McGinty, supra note 24, at 205 ("All but
two states, Hawaii and Utah, have some form of legalized gambling.").
123 See, e.g., Bisset, supra note 122, at 369 (stating that the United States points to "money
laundering concerns as the ... basis" for legislation that "effectively bans the supply of any
offshore gambling and betting services to the United States").
124 "E-wallet" is a term associated with the practice of "overseas companies creat[ing]
identities online with debit accounts [which make] it harder to identify the true owner." Id.
at 376.
12 Telebuy "charges gambling transactions directly to the bettor's phone bill." Id. at 377.
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credit cards on gambling sites.'26 Further, internet gambling is legal and
regulated in other countries and jurisdictions.12 7
Lifting the ban against online gambling also has a financial incentive. State
governments earned about $20 billion in taxes on legalized gambling in 2000,
and it has been estimated that illegal sports wagering outside of Nevada2 ' is
"upwards of $380 billion."129 U.S. Representative Jim McDermott introduced
legislation that would allow for the taxation of licensed Internet gambling in
the United States, which by his estimates could raise up to $42.8 billion over
the first ten years. 3 '
In the absence of a legitimate moral argument against it, and with the huge
tax potential, it seems unusual that the United States is apparently willing to
withdraw from its obligations, or risk endangering another one of its industries,
in order to protect its ban on internet gambling.
When the United States joined the WTO, there was much discussion about
the effects that membership would have on U.S. sovereignty. 3' Concerns were
loud and clear that a world organization could in effect dictate to the United
States what its trade law could entail.1 32 Many efforts were made to quiet these
fears. United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation that" 'no ruling by any
dispute panel, under this new dispute settlement mechanism.., can force us
to change any federal, state or local law or regulation.' Not the city council of
Los Angeles, nor the Senate of the United States can be bound by these dispute
settlement rulings."' 3 Kantor added that "[we] could be the subject of an
adverse ruling .... However, then we have a choice. We're not forced to
change any law as a result. That's up to the Congress of the United States.
126 Id. at 376-77.
127 See, e.g., Gambling Act 2005, c. 19 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts
2005/ukpga_20050019en I (regulating gambling in the United Kingdom).
121 Sports betting is legal in Nevada, but illegal in all other states. McGinty, supra note 24,
at 205.
129 Id.
130 Establishing Consistent Enforcement Policies in the Context of Online Wagers: Hearings
on H.R. 2607 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 93 (2007) [hereinafter
Gambling Enforcement Hearing] (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott).
3' See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
131 S. 2467, GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 37 (1994) (statement of Amb. Mickey
Kantor, United States Trade Rep.) (imperfectly quoting Section 102 of S. 2467).
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We've given up no sovereignty."' 34 Kantor accurately stated that the United
States has a choice of what to do following an adverse ruling. The DSB cannot
force Congress to change U.S. law, but at the same time, it is charged with
describing compliance measures, and the WTO is expected to facilitate
compliance. 3 5
Despite being powerless to force a law change, the WTO must nevertheless
be able to authorize retaliatory measures significant enough to give Antigua a
sufficient remedy if the United States elects to keep its law in place.
Otherwise, the United States will maintain its current laws, and Antigua will
have a mere favorable ruling without any justice.
It is important for Antigua to remember that it won the case and that it
should have no reason to negotiate for anything less than its own terms. In the
Bananas case, the EC announced its acceptance of the WTO verdict, but it
"refused to disclose any details of its implementation plan [and] insisted on
maintaining some trade preferences established in its banana regime. ,1 36 The
United States asserted that "it would settle for nothing less than full
implementation of the WTO ruling and that compensation would not be
acceptable,"' 3' declaring that" 'it would accept only a full dismantling of the
EC banana regime.' ,138 Now, the United States has switched positions, and
Antigua should emphasize U.S. hypocrisy as it attempts to secure an overhaul
of U.S. online gambling law.
Antigua shouldj oin with the other interested members and aim for a change
in U.S. law. Particularly for a country as small as Antigua, it would take an
extremely large amount of money or other concessions to make a settlement
worth losing this industry, which has already drastically declined in the last
decade. While the United States has appeared to foreclose the possibility of
changing its gambling laws, Congress has once before revised a law in
' Review of the Uruguay Round GATT Implications for Agricultural Trade: Hearings
Before the Comm. on Agriculture, 104th Cong. 64 (1994) (statement of Mike Espy, Secretary
of Agriculture).
"I World Trade Organization, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 54 (3d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/understandinge.pdf.
"36 Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Note, Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the World Trade
Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliancefrom
Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 149 (2001).
137 Id.
131 Id. at n. 160 (quoting Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push-Me,
Pull- You: The Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 32
INT'L L. 755, 777 (1998)).
2008]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
response to a WTO case.'39 In its dispute with the EU over the so-called
foreign sales corporations, the United States eventually changed the U.S. tax
code significantly, although "after years of congressional debate."14 This type
of legislative amendment would be ideal for Antigua, which could then legally
offer its gambling services to the millions of U.S. consumers who currently
gamble online illegally and to many more who might begin to gamble online
if it were made legal. For the United States to change its law, and thereby
overturn its moral objection, the arbitrator would have to authorize retaliation
"large enough to provide.., a counterweight to the 'anti-offshore gambling
lobby.' ,141 Antigua seems to have found a heavy enough counterweight in
Hollywood and the software industry. Surely these intellectual property
industries will not allow Congress to give away their intellectual property
rights because of a "moral" argument that is irrelevant in light of already
widespread online gambling, certain exceptions won by lobbies, and the
obvious presence of brick and mortar gambling throughout the country.
From the perspective of the WTO, the situation is delicate because it must
show its teeth to the most powerful country in the world while taking a risk
that the United States, the country most responsible for its existence, will turn
against it. One Harvard Law School professor has pointed out that "this
fledgling organization dominated by [this] huge monster in the United
States. . .must be scared out of [its] wits at the prospects of enforcing a ruling
that would instantly galvanize public opinion in the United States against
[it]."' 42 Scared or not, the WTO clearly must seize this opportunity to manifest
its authority. If it backs down, its credibility to the world will be
undermined. 143 It must continue what it started in the Bananas case: protecting
developing countries...: protecting developing countries by strictly applying
the GATS rules and authorizing appropriate counter measures from the misuse
of power in world trade.
The WTO already deserves much credit for enforcing the terms of the
GATS schedule despite the United States' position that it never intended to
include online gambling in its GATS obligations. The United States argued
'" See Request for the Establishment of a Panel, Annex E, UnitedStates-Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations," 1 WT/DS108/29 (Jan. 14, 2005) (noting the enactment of the
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000 in response to DSB recommendations).
"4 Yerkey, supra note 114.
141 Id. (quoting Sallie James, trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute).
142 Rivlin, supra note 76.
143 Id.
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that it had expressly excluded "sporting" from its GATS commitment
schedules, a term which, according to the United States, ordinarily includes
gambling in its English interpretation.'" Therefore, the United States believed
that the DSB panel misinterpreted the term. However, the panel recognized,
and the appellate body affirmed, that gambling was included in the
commitment with respect to "other recreational services," which the United
States included in its schedule.'45 United States Trade Representative
Veroneau called it "nonsensical" for countries to read the agreement as
opening the gambling market in light of the long-standing domestic ban on
interstate gambling.'
This view is certainly plausible, and indeed, the panel recognized that the
inclusion of gambling may have been unintentional.'47 It noted in its report,
that it had "some sympathy with the United States' point in this regard."'4 8
However, the panel admirably stood fast in its strict application of the law and
ruled that "the scope of a specific commitment cannot depend upon what a
Member intended or did not intend to do at the time of the negotiations."'49
The WTO is seeing through its promise that it will indeed level the playing
field so a country such as Antigua can stand on equal footing as the United
States.
As noted above, under the current GATS rules, any country may withdraw
or modify its commitments as long as it is willing to pay for it. 50 Such rules
favor a large nation like the United States in a dispute with a small nation such
as Antigua, even where other large members become involved, as did the EU
in this case. While Antigua brought the claim against the United States, the
EU took the opportunity to grab trade advantages in other areas, while Antigua
was unable to reach an agreement with the United States. 5' While allowing
' Panel Report, supra note 33, 3.45; see also Joel P. Trachtman, International Decision:
United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 861 (2005) (discussing the WTO's decision).
14' Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, 373, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005); Panel Report,
Measures Affecting Gambling and Betting Services, 4.20, WT/D/238/R.
146 Palmer, supra note 41.
117 Panel Report, Measures Affecting Gambling and Betting Services, 6.136, WT/D238/R.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
"' See Daniel Pruzin, US. Reaches Agreement With EU at WTO On Compensation for
Internet Gambling, INT'L TRADE DAiLY, Dec. 18, 2007, at D1 (stating that the EU "reached a
deal with the United States [for] improved access to the US market for European services
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the United States to establish an arguably dangerous precedent, these rules may
threaten the entire trade regime.
The settlement reached between the United States and the European Union
on compensation for the U.S. withdrawal of its obligations has changed
Antigua's expectations once again. Antigua and several European gambling
companies had hoped that the EU would stand alongside them and fight on
their behalf for a change in U.S. policy.'52 Instead, the EU opted for increased
access in the postal, warehousing, and research services. 53 Although Antigua
still has the power to prevent the U.S. withdrawal until it receives
compensation, its bargaining power seems to be severely weakened because
of the low arbitral award coupled with the EU's exit from negotiations.'54
While the EU's departure from this case removes a substantial obstacle in the
United States' quest to withdraw, negotiations are still taking place with India,
Costa Rica, and Macao, any of which can oppose the U.S. withdrawal.' 55
The United States' response to this case establishes a risky precedent.
Rather than leave it to the countries to carry out their obligations in good faith,
the WTO should use this case to examine the rules regarding commitment
withdrawal, and it should make an effort to avoid such withdrawal as a result.
In a statement to the House Committee on the Judiciary, former United States
Trade Representative Director of Policy Planning Naotaka Matsukata warned
of the policy implications of a withdrawal. He noted that China has
continually complained of the burden that its accession commitments have
placed on the country, and would welcome the opportunity to reduce its
obligations.' 56 He also commented that Russia, currently in negotiations to
enter into the WTO, would welcome a precedent which would allow it to make
commitments knowing that it can later scale them back to its liking.'57 As Mr.
suppliers).
'52 See Jonathan Lynn, Antigua Wins Modest Sanctions in U.S. Gambling Case, REUTERS
NEWS, Dec. 21,2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/companynewsandPR/indusL21601574200
71221.
"' Pruzin, supra note 15 1.
114 See Lynn, supra note 152 (discussing the EU's exit and the low award).
155 See id. (pointing out that negotiations with these states continue and that withdrawal
requires the United States to "offer comparable access in other sectors").
156 Gambling Enforcement Hearings, supra note 130, at 111 (statement of Naokata
Matsukata, Senior Policy Advisor, Alston & Bird, LLP).
5' Id.; see also, id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Shelley Berkley) ("This is the trade equivalent of
taking our ball and going home, and sets a dangerous precedent for other nations. You can be
sure that if China one day decides that it shouldn't have to comply with its WTO obligations, we
will be the first to object.").
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Matsukata put it, "A global trading order doesn't fall all at once, but one rule
at a time."' 58
What the United States is essentially doing is buying the right to break
international law. As Professor Joseph Weiler explained before the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives:
When a member fails to comply with a decision of the WTO
Appellate Body and Dispute Settlement Body, it opens itself to
trade sanctions by the winning country in the form of withdrawal
of concessions. This has been interpreted by some to suggest that
as long as the US was willing to submit itself to such sanctions,
it was discharging its obligations under the WTO system. This
is an utter misconception of the system. The withdrawal of
concessions is meant to be a sanction and incentive for a
recalcitrant Member to fulfill its obligation, not an indulgence
you buy to expiate your wrong doing. To argue otherwise would
be the equivalent of a rich man claiming that as long [as] he was
willing to pay the fine, he was under no legal obligation to move
the car he parked in front of a fire hydrant." 9
Professor Weiler further stated that the United States' commitments
withdrawal "might be regarded and is regarded by many as a cynical
manipulation of the system--you lose the game, so you try and change the
rules. It also charts a way and creates a political precedent which might harm
US interests when other countries emulate such behavior.' 160 It appears that
if the WTO allows the United States to withdraw its obligations in return for
paying compensation, other members will surely follow, and these so called
"obligations" will be rendered meaningless and easily avoidable by any
member willing to pay. The question is made difficult because of sovereignty
concerns that arise when a country wants to change its domestic laws. On the
other hand, a system of world trade rules may not be worth having if there is
no respect for obligations and commitments.
'58 Id. at 11 1 (statement of Naokata Matsukata, Senior Policy Advisor, Alston & Bird, LLP).
159 Id. at 31 (statement of Joseph H.H. Weiler, Professor & Director, Jean Monnet Center for
International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, New York University School of Law).
160 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When Antigua won its case against the United States, it was a remarkable
victory by the WTO's smallest member against one of its largest. Reluctant
to even bring the case, Antigua finally did so with the help of the gambling
industry161 because of the importance of internet gambling to its tiny
economy.162 While other nations have joined the cause and are seeking
compensation from the United States, these nations, such as the EU, have
countless other industries and sectors with which they can negotiate. Antigua,
on the other hand, is left with a $21 million annual award which is supposed
to offset the loss of access by a key industry to one of the world's largest
markets. 63 The WTO found that by acting in a manner counter to international
law, the United States has harmed Antigua. 164 It was sympathetic to Antigua's
unusual situation where normal retaliatory measures are inadequate, and it
gave a rare award which allows Antigua to infringe on U.S. intellectual
property to a specified dollar amount. 165 The authorization is meant to induce
the United States to alter its trade laws in order to bring them into compliance
with the obligations they made upon entrance to the WTO trade regime.
However, in May of 2007 the United States announced that instead of
complying with the DSB decision it would simply modify its GATS schedule
to withdraw the commitment that was the subject of Antigua's challenge. 166
The move was deeply disappointing to Antigua and also constituted a
dangerous precedent that many believe will be followed by other countries,
disrupting the order of the trade regime.'67
61 Blustein, supra note 23.
162 See id. (quoting Sir Ronald Sanders, then the Antiguan ambassadorto the WTO, as saying,
"Did we not have a duty to our citizens to protect their jobs?" in reference to Antigua's filing a
complaint).
163 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, 3.189, 3.189, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 31, 2007).
'" Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
165 Decision by the Arbitrator, Measures Affecting Gambling and Betting Services,
3.188, 3.189, 4.7, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 31, 2007).
'" See Palmer, supra note 41 (describing U.S. plans to modify its WTO service commitments
in response to the ruling).
167 See Gambling Enforcement Hearings, supra note 130, at 11 1 (statement of Naotaka
Matsukata, Senior Policy Advisor, Alston & Bird, LLP) (positing that if the United States
withdraws from the GATS obligations, the policy implications could be dire).
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There is a movement in Congress to change the U.S. response to the DSB's
ruling.'68 In a letter to United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab,
eight House democrats, including Judiciary Committee Chairman John
Conyers and Representative Barney Frank, expressed concern about the way
the White House and U.S. Trade Representative were handling this case,
saying that the administration's actions without Congressional input
constituted a "drastic step ... which could have significant consequences for
the entire WTO system."'1
69
But the WTO should not rely on the internal politics of the United States
to develop a plan for forcing compliance with its rulings. The WTO members
should take steps to make it as difficult as possible for a member to withdraw
from its obligations. It is in the best interest of the United States and other
members to reserve withdrawal or modification of obligations only for the
most necessary of circumstances. A member should not be allowed to
withdraw simply because it desires or because it committed an oversight in
drafting its commitments. After all, other countries may adjust their
economies in view of such commitments, and corporations and investors will
gear their economic activities based on other members' commitments and
promises of access.'70
The can of worms that could be opened following a United States
withdrawal would lead to a loss of trust, credibility, and predictability in the
world trade regime. Such a precedent may bring irreversible damage to the
WTO. The United States Representative to the WTO stated after the United
States won its famous dispute with the European Union regarding the
exportation of meat hormones: "It [is] important for the integrity and viability
of the dispute settlement mechanism that Members compl[y] with the DSB's
recommendations.'' It now seems that this argument only applies when the
United States is on the winning side.
Antigua's case shows a basic flaw with the WTO dispute settlement system
when used to resolve a dispute between countries of such unequal size and
power. The authorization to suspend intellectual property rights was for the
16' Sarah Poison, Frank; Conyers Team Up in Letter to Trade Rep, POKERLISTINGS.COM,
Nov. 19,2007, http://www.pokerfistings.com/fi-ank-conyers-teamn-up-in-letter-to-trade-rep-20454.
169 Jim Abrams, US. Fights WTO Over Internet Gambling, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19,2007,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/1 1/1 9/us-fightswtoover
_intemetgambling/.
170 See, e.g., Establishing Consistent Enforcement Policies in the Contest of Wagers: Hearing
on H.R. 2607Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 93-94 (2007) (statement of
Rep. Jim McDermott) (supporting proposal legislation that taxes the internet gambling industry).
171 Minutes of Meeting, Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DSB/M/43 (Apr. 8, 1998).
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amount of $21 million annually. 72 This amount is not nearly significant
enough to induce the United States to change its policies if the government
feels strongly about keeping them. It can simply use this as a starting point to
negotiate with Antigua for some other settlement, while Antigua continues to
suffer from restricted access for its gambling industry. Nor did the other
members who joined in the negotiations after the United States decided to
withdraw its obligations seem to help Antigua. In fact, the European Union
negotiated an agreement regarding postal, warehousing, and research
services. 173 The EU and European companies in those industries essentially
won a free settlement out of the Antiguan case, while the Antiguan government
and the affected gambling industries received nothing. The problem is that the
arbitrator awarded the amount that it deemed appropriate given the losses to
the Antiguan industry, but this amount is too low to give any negotiating power
to such a small and relatively powerless complaining country. With
negotiations anchored to such a low amount, the United States will likely be
able to buy its way out of compliance and will thus be able to withdraw or
modify its obligations.
Thus, it seems the best way to counter this problem is, in addition to
authorizing cross-sector retaliation against U.S. intellectual property rights, the
WTO should rework the withdrawal rules to address the concerns springing
out of the United States' action in this case. Only when a country is bound to
trade rules that it voluntarily consented to can retaliation have any effect. This
would give Antigua's award real effect because the United States would only
be able to stop the retaliation by bringing its laws into conformity with the
WTO decision. For any particular amount that the DSB authorizes, the
inequalities discussed above can best be leveled by authorizing cross-sector
retaliation, although it is unclear if and how Antigua will use this award. It
may not be worthwhile for Antigua to invest in production for products using
U.S. intellectual property, and the award may be worthless. On the other hand,
if Antigua finds an ally in lobbyists from the intellectual property industries in
the United States, which can convince the U.S. government that a change in the
gambling laws will be the least painful response to the case, then this may be
a very powerful and valuable asset. Then, the gap in negotiating power may
indeed be narrowed, and the DSB will be the guarantee of fair trade that it was
supposed to be.
172 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, 3.189, 3.189, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 31, 2007).
173 Pruzin, supra note 151.
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